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Open accea b s t r a c t
Bulk data analysis eschews file extraction and analysis, common in forensic practice today,
and instead processes data in “bulk,” recognizing and extracting salient details (“features”)
of use in the typical digital forensics investigation. This article presents the requirements,
design and implementation of the bulk_extractor, a high-performance carving and feature
extraction tool that uses bulk data analysis to allow the triage and rapid exploitation of
digital media. Bulk data analysis and the bulk_extractor are designed to complement
traditional forensic approaches, not replace them. The approach and implementation offer
several important advances over today’s forensic tools, including optimistic decompres-
sion of compressed data, context-based stop-lists, and the use of a “forensic path” to
document both the physical location and forensic transformations necessary to recon-
struct extracted evidence. The bulk_extractor is a stream-based forensic tool, meaning that
it scans the entire media from beginning to end without seeking the disk head, and is fully
parallelized, allowing it to work at the maximum I/O capabilities of the underlying hard-
ware (provided that the system has sufficient CPU resources). Although bulk_extractor was
developed as a research prototype, it has proved useful in actual police investigations, two
of which this article recounts.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Digital forensics investigations have grown more difficult as
the capacity and diversity of devices containing digital
evidence increases.
Many approaches have been proposed for addressing the
data onslaught, including parallelization and multi-
processing (Ayers, 2009; Richard and Roussev, 2006), statis-
tical sampling (Garfinkel et al., 2010; Mora, 2010), and even
extending the time a suspect can be held without charge so
that evidence may be analyzed (Secretary of State for the
Home Department, 2007). But no matter what approach isss under CC BY-NC-ND license.used to improve performance, so long as a backlog exists,
some process must allocate limited forensic resources.
Diversity of media represents a different kind of challenge.
Increasingly evidence needs to be analyzed that is in file
system and file formats not supported by current tools.
Frequently the only way to analyze such data is to scavenge it
for printable strings and rely on the human examiner to make
sense of the data that are manually recovered.
Many organizations prioritize forensic processing with
reference to the nature of the case, without taking into
account the contents of the media itself. For example, the
FBI’s regional computer forensics laboratories give media
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Many local police departments use trial dates and the statute
of limitations to prioritize their workload.
Triage is a term widely used to denote the prioritization of
work according to a quality inherent in the objects being acted
upon. This article proposes expanding triage to include the
results of a rapid and largely automated analysis, performed
when themedia is first encountered. The results of such triage
can frequently reveal if the media is likely to have intelligence
value and, therefore, if the media should be prioritized for
immediate deep analysis.
This article describes advances recently made in bulk data
analysis, an approach for performing digital forensics that
eschews file extraction, and instead focuses on the processing
of bulk data and the extraction of salient details (“features”).
Unlike file-based approaches, bulk data analysis is particu-
larly well-suited to triage. Furthermore, combining forensic
feature extraction (Garfinkel, 2006) with optimistic decom-
pression (x3.3) allows the recovery of features that are other-
wise missed using current tools. Triage using bulk data
analysis is particularly useful in cases that involve multiple
pieces of digital evidence. For example, in a case involving
credit card theft, bulk data analysis can quickly identify which
laptop or cell phone has the largest collection of credit card
numbers, allowing investigators to prioritize. In an organized
crime or public corruption case, bulk data analysis can rapidly
identify which hard drives or cell phones contain email
addresses of interest and rapidly generate new leads. Users
have seen that the specialized bulk analysis software pre-
sented in this article can frequently process digital media
significantly faster than today’s industry standard tools.
Thus, systematic bulk data analysis has the potential for
transforming digital media analysis in law enforcement
from a conviction-support tool (through the identification of
illegal materials) to a tool that provides support early in an
investigation.1.1. Contributions
This paper makes multiple contributions to the theory and
practice of digital forensics. First, it shows that bulk data
analysis without reference to an underlying file system can be
productively used as a fast analysis step during the early part
of an investigation. It shows that bulk data analysis is easily
adopted to stream processing and multi-threading. It shows
that recall rates of bulk data analysis can be significantly
improved through the use of optimistic decompression and
recursive re-analysis, for the simple reason that many
features of forensic interest are present in compressed byte
streams located in the unallocated regions of typical file
systems.
This paper presents bulk_extractor, a powerful tool for
performing bulk data analysis. It shares the experience of
developing bulk_extractor, providing a model for the develop-
ment of future digital forensic tools.
This paper introduces the concept of the context-sensitive
stop list, and explains how stop lists that do not include
context are susceptible to manipulation by criminals and
other adversaries.This paper presents a new forensic disk image designed for
testingmodern digital forensic tools. It presents an evaluation
using this image that compares bulk_extractor with Guidance
Software’s EnCase (Guidance Software, Inc., 2011) and the
traditional approach of running the Unix strings and grep
commands. It shows that bulk_extractor can recover more
kinds of high-value forensic features than current tools and
explains the reasons for improved recall performance.
Finally, this paper presents two real-world case studies
that show how features provided by bulk data analysis have
been used productively in forensic investigations.
1.2. Outline of this article
This concludes the introduction. Section 2 discusses related
work. Section 3 discusses the design of the bulk analysis
system while Section 4 discusses the bulk_extractor imple-
mentation. Section 5 presents the results of bulk_extractor run
against both test data and hundreds of forensic images.
Section 6 presents two case studies. Section 7 discusses limi-
tations of our architecture and opportunities for future work.
Section 8 concludes.2. Related work
2.1. File-based forensics, bulk data analysis, and file
carving
Two complementary approaches are now used in the pro-
cessing of digital evidence: file-based approaches and bulk data
analysis.
File-based approaches are widely used by digital forensic
examiners and implemented by popular tools such as Guid-
ance Software’s EnCase (Guidance Software, Inc., 2011) and
AccessData’s FTK (AccessData, 2011). Such tools operate by
finding, extracting, identifying and processing filesdthat is,
a sequential collection of bytes pointed to by file system
metadata.
Because they mirror the way that users interact with
computers, file-based approaches have the advantage of being
easy to understand. File-based approaches also integrate well
with most legal systems, as extracted files can be printed and
entered into evidence. They have the disadvantage of ignoring
data not contained within files. Additional limitations of file-
based approaches are discussed elsewhere (Garfinkel, 2010).
In bulk data analysis, digital content is examined without
regard to file system metadata. Instead, data of interest is
identified by content and processed, extracted, and reported
as necessary. File carving is an example of bulk data analysis,
although it is limited, because file carving ignores bulk data
that cannot be assembled into files.
File-based approaches and bulk data analysis are comple-
mentary. In file-based approaches the access of the forensic
tool mirrors that of the media’s original user and of typical
computer users. This makes the results easier to put in
context, easier to explain to those who may not have a tech-
nical background, and potentially easier to validate with
extrinsic data. Bulk data approaches have the advantage of
being applicable to all types of computer systems, file
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existing tools. Bulk data analysis can also be readily applied to
media that has been damaged or partially overwritten. Finally,
in many cases bulk data analysis can find information that is
not recoverable through file-based approaches because of
limitations in specific file-based decoders.
2.2. Triage
Rogers et al. (2006) presented a Field Triage Process Model that
focused on approaches for triage using existing tools. Assert-
ing that “the value of planning and pre-raid intelligence
cannot be over-emphasized,” the authors presented
a methodical and largely manual triage process that involved
first ranking the media to be analyzed and then performing
a systematic exploration of the data that each device
contained.
Automated tools with limited triage functions are available
commercially. For example, ADF Triage by ADF Solutions can
scan a subject hard drive for documents containing specific
keywords and images likely to be pornographic (Parsonage,
2009).
Pearson and Watson (2010) published the book Digital
Triage which is heavily based on the experience of Explosive
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams in Iraq, with chapters on
battlefield forensics, the conducting of pre- and post-blast
investigations, and the analysis of cell phones on the
battlefield.
The work presented in this paper is most similar to the
DEC0DE system developed by Walls et al. (2011). That system
uses data-driven dynamic programming to identify call logs
and address book entries in cell phone memory dumps
without advance knowledge of how a vendor formats the
information. The system uses block hash filtering to find
data blocks common with other phones; these blocks are
then removed, leaving blocks of data likely to contain
information specific to the subject phone. This resulting data
is analyzed with a probabilistic state machine. The authors
state that their approach can process a 64 MB phone image in
15 min. The approach embodied in DEC0DE is not applicable
to digital forensics in general, but is restricted to the limited
domain of extracting structured information, such as
extracting call detail records and SMS logs from cell phone
memory dumps.
Clearly, even without specialized tools, examiners will
engage in workflow prioritization whenever there exists
a backlog of media to process. Nevertheless, policy and
experience indicates that frequently there is no triage process
at all, as work is frequently prioritized without reference to
the data contained in the media.
2.3. Recursive re-analysis and the recovery of
compressed information
The approach of recursively re-analyzing data during forensic
analysis is widely used by anti-virus programs, existingmedia
forensics tools (e.g. Guidance Software, Inc., 2011; AccessData,
2011), and network forensics tools. However, these tools
generally apply re-analysis solely to intact container files.
PyFlag (Cohen, 2008) applies recursive re-analysis to data inruns of unallocated sectors, but only attempts to decompress
from the beginning of each run. The NetIntercept (Corey et al.,
2002) network forensic tool automatically decompresses
compressed network streams, but only for protocols known to
use compression.2.4. Single-block forensics
Prior research introduced a simplified form of bulk data
processing that performed analysis of single sectors
(Garfinkel et al., 2010). The approach presented here is more
comprehensive, as it will identify features that cross sectors
or span multiple sectors. Further, this work also includes
recursive re-analysis of bulk data, while the prior single-
block work did not.2.5. Forensic feature extraction
Computer media frequently contains a persistent record of
a subject’s associates, activities, and financial activities. As
such, software that automatically searches for these types of
artifacts can aid many investigations. The term forensic feature
extraction describes this process (Garfinkel, 2006).
Many forensic tools allow searching files and unallocated
sectors for strings that match user-specified regular expres-
sions. Vendors and trainers publish lists of regular expressions
that match email addresses, US telephone numbers, US social
security numbers, credit card numbers, IP addresses, and
other kinds of information typically useful in an investigation
(e.g. AccessData Corporation, 2008; Bunting, 2008, p. 304e305).
Credit card number searches are also performed by the Cornell
University Spider forensic tool (Cornell University IT Security
Office, 2008). The University of Michigan Information
Technology Security Services reviewed several tools for
discovering credit card and social security numbers in 2008.
The work presented here improves prior work in forensic
feature extraction by using hand-tuned rules that consider
local context, improving the precision of extraction without
adversely impacting recall. Furthermore, existing feature
extraction systems do not in general extract features from
compressed or otherwise encoded data.2.6. Parallel processing
More than four decades of research has resulted in numerous
approaches for speeding text processing through the use of
parallelism. Indeed, Bird et al. discussed parallelized search-
ing of a 50 GB database using specialized machines in 1977.
Similar efforts continue to this day (Konstantopoulos et al.,
2009).
Although there have been some attempts to parallelize
forensic tools, little of this work is being used in the field. For
example, Marziale et al. adapted the Scalpel file carver to
offload complex computations to a GPU, but that version of
Scalpel was never released. Collange et al. (2009) considered
the use of GPUs to speed hash-based carving, but no
commercial forensic tool uses GPUs for hashing due to I/O
limitations. Urias et al. (2008) considered a variety of issues
involving the parallelized processing of RAID storage systems,
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FTK are still largely single-threaded.
The parallelization described in this paper is distinguished
from prior efforts in that it is easily implemented and auto-
matically takes advantage of general-purpose multi-core
CPUs, the most common form of parallelized hardware
available. As such, this parallelism can be readily used by
current practitioners on hardware that they already have.
Indeed, the thread pool implementation described in this
paper was recently incorporated into the popular md5deep
hashing program (Kornblum, 2011).2.7. Tool validation
The US Supreme Court held in Daubert that scientific evidence
presented in court must involve established techniques that
are peer-reviewed and have measurable error rates (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579, 1993;
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science
Community, 2009). But little is known about the accuracy of
feature extraction and string search of today’s forensic tools
(Lyle, 2010). The National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology’s Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program created
draft specifications for String Search and Deleted File
Recovery (CFTT, 2008), but the drafts have not advanced past
an initial version and no test results have been published.
Important real-world requirements are missing from these
drafts, such as the ability to recover information from
complex document formats and compressed data.
In the absence of a standard, Guo et al. (2010) advocate
testing tools with simplified data sets containing known tar-
getsdfor example, by creating documents containing the
word “evidence” and then searching for the word. This paper
presents an improvement to Guo’s procedure that involves
embedding different targets in different file formats (x5.1).
This improvement makes it significantly easier to determine
the source of each extracted feature, since each feature is
self-identifying. A similar approach has since been identified
for use in the NIST Deleted File Recovery Test Images
after the NIST team was provided with a draft of this paper
(CFTT, 2012).3. Introducing bulk_extractor
The bulk_extractor is a program that extracts email addresses,
credit card numbers, URLs, and other types of information
from any kind of digital evidence. The program operates on
disk images in raw, split-raw, EnCase E01 (Metz, 2008), and
AFF (Garfinkel et al., 2006) formats, but the program has also
been used productively on sessionized TCP/IP traffic,
memory dumps, and archives of files downloaded from the
Internet. The program can also directly analyze media
directly connected to the analyst’s computerdfor example,
with a write blocker. The data to be analyzed are divided into
pages that are separately processed by one or more scanners.
Identified features are stored in feature files, a simple line-
based format containing extracted features, their location,
and local context.The bulk_extractor detects and optimistically decompress
data in ZIP, gzip, and Microsoft’s XPress Block Memory
Compression algorithm (Suiche, 2008). This has proven useful
in recovering email addresses from within fragments of cor-
rupted Windows hibernation files.
The bulk_extractor gets its speed through the use of GNU
flex (The Flex Project, 2008), which allows multiple regular
expressions to be compiled into a single finite state machine,
and multi-threading (x4.4), which allows multiple pages to be
analyzed at the same time on different cores.
After the features have been extracted, bulk_extractor builds
a histogram of email addresses, Google search terms, and
other extracted features. Stop lists can remove features not
relevant to a case.
The remainder of this section introduces bulk_extractor
with a typical case and then presents the program’s overall
design; the following section (x4) discusses the current
implementation; Section 5 presents approaches for validation.
3.1. Use case
The bulk_extractor is designed to be used in the early part of an
investigation involving digital media. A typical case might
involve the analysis of 20 laptops and desktops seized from
suspected members of a child exploitation group. Each piece
of subject media is connected to an analyst workstation with
a write-blocker and directly processed with bulk_extractor.
(Time to initiate: approximately 5 min per machine.) The
bulk_extractor runs in a batch, unattended operation. (Time to
process: between 1 and 8 h per piece of media, depending on
size and complexity of the subject data.)
Each running instance of bulk_extractor creates a directory
where the program’s output is stored. The output consists of
one or more feature files (Fig. 2). Each feature file is a text file
that contains the location of each feature found, the feature
itself, and the feature surrounded by its local context (typi-
cally 16 characters from either side of the feature). Typical
feature files are email.txt for email addresses, url.txt for URLs,
aes.txt for AES keys, and so on. Some of the information that is
present in the feature files originated in compressed data on
the subject disk. For example,many URLs and email addresses
were present in browser cache entries compressed with the
gzip compression algorithm. Because it was compressed, the
data would not be evident simply by running the Unix
“strings” program or by a manual examination of the disk
sectors.
When the extraction phase is finished, each instance of
bulk_extractor reads the feature files and creates a feature
histogram for each file. Post-processing also extracts a histo-
gram of popular search terms.
When the program finishes, the examiner may manually
review the histogram files:
 The list of email addresses provides the examiner with
a quick report of individuals that may have some connec-
tion to the drive. Email addresses can appear on a drive for
many reasonsdthey can be in emailmessages, or in theweb
cache from webmail, or in a web cache because they
appeared at the bottomof a news article that’s being read, or
even because they were in a Microsoft Office document.
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email addresses on a drive are typically present because
they were in multiple email or webmail messages, and that
is usually because they are associatedwith either the drive’s
primary user or one of that person’s correspondents.
 Search terms can be used as an indicator of the computer
user’s intent.
 The presence, frequency and number of credit card
numbers can be used to infer if the drive had a large number
of credit card numbers (an indication of either credit card
processing or credit card fraud), or a high frequency of
very few credit card numbers (an indicator of frequent
e-commerce).
Tools such as “grep” can be used to scan the list of URLs to
extract identifiers for Facebook, Microsoft Live, and other
online services. Lists of identifiers can also be uploaded to
other systems for correlation with law enforcement
databases.
Although the feature files can be directly entered into
evidence or used as the basis of a formal report, more
commonly the examiner will use the data to inform a more
detailed analysis of the media with a traditional forensic tool
such as EnCase or FTK. In this manner, bulk_extractor is used
for triagedthat is, to prioritize analysis based on the content
of themedia itself, rather than the circumstances surrounding
the media’s capture.
Because it is easy to use and readily integrated with
existing forensic processes, bulk_extractor has been adopted by
a number of law enforcement organizations, and its use is
growing.
3.2. Requirements study
Between 2003 and 2005 a prototype bulk media analysis tool
was developed by the author to assist in an unrelated inves-
tigation. Experience showed the tool to be significantly faster
than file-based systems and allowed easy answer to questions
of interest early in an investigation, such as Does this drive
contain sensitive information? What search terms were used? and
what is the most common email address on the drive?
Because the prototype did not map to an existing forensic
tool category, a series of unstructured interviews were held
with local, state and federal law enforcement (LE) forensic
examiners to determine if there was a need for this new kind
of tool. In total, approximately 20 interviews took place
between 2005 and 2008.
Although it may seem that the tool development described
here was the result of documented needs stated by LE, this
was not the case. LE practitioners interviewed at the time
were generally pleased with their then-current tools, which
seemed quite powerful and had required considerable effort
to master. Examiners merely wanted their existing tools to
run fasterdthey were not looking for tools that implemented
fundamentally new approaches. Indeed, at the beginning of
the interviews, several LE practitioners and trainers spoke
derisively of the desire to create a so-called “get evidence”
button. Such a button could not be created, these practitioners
asserted, because a computer would never be able to make
sense of all the information left behind on a digital storagedevice and arrange it in amanner that was consistentwith the
objectives of a case.
It was only after seeing some of the initial results of the
early prototype that some analysts became enthusiastic about
the work and requested that the tool be further developed to
extract specific types of information, including:
 Email addresses
 Credit card numbers, including track 2 information
 Search terms (extracted from URLs)
 Phone numbers
 GPS coordinates
 EXIF (Exchangeable Image File Format) information from
JPEG images
 A list of all words present on the disk, for use in password
cracking
Interviewees also provided a number of operational
requirements:
 Run on Windows, Linux and Macintosh-based systems
 Operate on raw disk images, split-raw volumes, EnCase E01
evidence containers, and AFF evidence containers
 Perform batch analysis with no user input
 Allow users to provide additional regular expressions for
searches
 Automatically extract features from compressed data
 Run as fast as the physical drive or storage system could
deliver data
 Identify the specific files in the file system that are the
source of the extracted features
 Produce output as an easy to use text file
 Never crash
The interviews revealed that the primary need for such
a tool was triagedto prioritizewhich pieces of digital evidence
should be analyzed first, and to identify specific email
addresses for follow-up investigation. Final analysis, however,
would typically be performed with an “approved” tool.
3.3. Forensic scanners, feature extractors and optimistic
decompression
The bulk_extractor employs multiple scanners that run
sequentially on raw digital evidence. These scanners are
provided with a buffer to analyze (initially corresponding to
a 16 MiB page of data read from the disk image) the location or
path of the buffer’s first byte, and a mechanism for recording
extracted features. Special logic is used to handle features that
span across buffer borders (x4.3). All buffers are processed by
all scanners until there are no more buffers to analyze. At this
point the program performs post-processing and finally exits.
There are two types of scanners. Basic scanners are limited
to analyzing the buffer and recording what they find. An
example is the email scanner scan_email, which can find email
addresses, RFC822 headers, and other recognizable strings
likely to be in email messages.
Recursive scanners, as their name implies, can decode data
and pass it back to the buffer processor for re-analysis. An
example is scan_zip, which detects the components of ZIP files,
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data, and passes the decompressed data back to the buffer
processor. Most of bulk_extractor’s recursive scanners are opti-
mistic. That is, they scan the entire buffer for data that can be
decompressedor otherwise transformedand, if theyfind it, they
transform it as appropriate. In addition to decompressing, bul-
k_extractorusesoptimistic transformations forBASE64decoding,
PDF text extraction, and other encodings. Optimistic decoding
produces significantly higher recall rates than approaches that
only decode data from specifically recognized file formats.
The speed of the forensic tool is obviously impacted by the
use of additional scanners: the degree of the impact depends
on the data being analyzed. A disk image that contains no
compressed data will be processed more slowly merely
because the tool scans for compressed data; in testing this
degradation is not significant. Significant amounts of
compressed data, in contrast, will significantly slow process-
ing, especially if compressed data is contained within other
compressed regions.
Forensic programs that recursively process compressed
datamust guard against decompression bombsdfiles that, when
fully decompressed, extend to many terabytes, petabytes, or
more (Aera Network Security, 2009). The bulk_extractor
implements three defenses against compression bombs. First,
only a configurable portion of each compressed stream is
decompressed. Second, the page processor will not call the
recursive scanners when the depth reaches a configurable
limit (by default, five recursions). Finally, the tool computes
the cryptographic hash for each compressed region prior to
decompression; regions that have the same hash are only
decompressed once.
3.4. Feature files
Analysts requested that the tool provide output as a simple
text file that could be viewed with an editor or processed with
other “scripting” tools. Realizing this request is bulk_extractor’s
feature file format, a tab-delimited text file containing the offset
where each feature was found, the feature itself, and a con-
figurable number of bytes that precede and follow the feature
in the evidence file (Fig. 2). Feature files are not sorted but are
loosely ordered. The order is “loose” because it is determined,
in part, by the execution order of the multiple threads. As
a result, running bulk_extractor twice on the same subject
media will likely result in feature files that contain the same
lines, but for which the lines appear in a different order.
(Sorting the lines during processing would require either
additional memory or stalling one or more threads, both
unacceptable solutions.)
When it is necessary to report multiple values associated
with each extracted feature, the second and/or third fields of
the feature file can be replaced with an XML fragment. For
example, the JPEG scanner uses a block of XML to report all of
the fields associated with EXIF structures found within
embedded JPEGs.
3.5. Forensic location, path, and file system correlation
For reporting purposes it is important to identify the location
at which each piece of extracted information is found. Thiscan be challenging when using tools that have the ability to
extract information from within compressed objects, because
it is also necessary to document how the data must be
decompressed or otherwise decoded.
There are at least five potential sources of compressed data
on a hard drive:
1. Many web browsers download data from web servers with
gzip compression and persist the compressed stream
directly to the web cache. (The percentage of web servers
employing compression increased from less than 5%e30%
between 2003 and 2010 (Port80 Software, 2010) because
compression significantly increases web performance
(Pierzchala, 2006; Srinivasan, 2003).)
2. NTFS file compression may result in disk sectors that
contain compressed data. Themost commonly compressed
files are Windows restore points, as the operating system
compresses these automatically. However, users may
choose to have any file compressed.
3. Windows hibernation files frequently contain forensically
important information. Complicating access to this file is
Microsoft’s use of a proprietary compression algorithm
called Xpress (Suiche, 2008) and the fact that Windows
overwrites the beginning of the hibernation file when the
operating system resumes from hibernation. Also, the
hibernation file’s location on the hard drive moves as
a result of NTFS defragmentation operations (Beverly et al.,
2011); thus, any software that hopes to recover features
from hibernation files must be able to decompress incom-
plete hibernation file fragments.
4. Files are increasingly bundled together and distributed as
ZIP, RAR, or .tar.gz archives for convenience and to decrease
bandwidth requirements. These files are frequently written
to a hard drive. If deleted, one of the components may be
overwritten while the others remain.
5. The .docx and .pptx file formats used by Microsoft Office
store content as compressed XML files in ZIP archives
(Garfinkel and Migletz, 2009).
Consider amessage containing a set of credit card numbers
viewed using a webmail service. If the web client and server
both support HTTP compression, theweb pagewill most likely
be downloaded as a gzip-compressed stream; both Firefox and
Internet Explorer will store the compressed stream in the
browser cache. If the computer is suspended, the web
browser’ memory may be compressed with Xpress and stored
in the hibernation file. It is not enough simply to report where
the credit card numbers are found on the subject’s disk,
because looking at the disk sectors with a hex editor will not
show human-readable strings: it is also necessary to explain
how the data must be transformed to make them intelligible.
Current forensic tools do not encounter this problem
because they ignore compressed data that is not in known
compressed file container formats.
To resolve this problem, bulk_extractor reports a forensic
path for each feature found. For features recovered from
uncompressed data, the forensic path is simply the distance
in bytes from the beginning of the media. In cases where the
feature is contained within an object that is decompressed or
otherwise processed by a recursive scanner, the forensic path
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 5 6e7 262contains information that can be used to repeat the decoding
process.
For example, the fourth line of Fig. 2 indicates that
jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org is found by decompressing the gzip
stream found at byte offset 318,707,924 from the start of the
disk image; the email address occurs 70 bytes from the start of
the decompressed stream. (The email address is contained
within the file /casper/filesystem.squashfs.)
Forensic paths can be extended: the email address nelson@
crynwr.com in Fig. 2 is found by decompressing the gzip
stream that begins at byte offset 946,315,592; 6400 bytes into the
decompressed stream is a second compressed stream; the
email address is found 1600 bytes into that stream. (This email
address appears within the file gnash-common_0.8.4-0ubuntu1_
i386.deb in the directory /var/cache/apt/archives/.)
Forensic paths can be readily translated to a specific loca-
tion in a resident or deleted file with a file system map. The
fiwalk program (Garfinkel, 2009) produces such a map in just
a fewminutes formost disk drives smaller than a terabyte; the
operation is fast because only file system metadata is exam-
ined. The program file_locations.py, included with bulk_
extractor, can then be used to annotate a feature file with the
file names corresponding to the sectors from which the
features were extracted.Fig. 1 e Diagram showing overview of the bulk_extractor architec
or individual files and puts data into buffer structures called “s
scanners operating in the thread pool. Some of the scanners (e.g
which are in turn processed by all of the scanners. Features tha
processed by the histogram processor into histogram files. A g
allows the resultant feature files to be browsed at the conclusioTo recap: today’s practice for describing the location of
a feature extracted from a disk image is to report the sector
number or offset where the evidence is found. The evidence
can then be examinedwith a tool such as a hex editor to verify
the existence of the feature. This approach simply does not
work when the feature resides within compressed data:
examining the sector with a hex editor merely shows binary
data. The forensic path, introduced here, provides a clear,
concise and unambiguous way to describe both the location of
the extracted features and the specific decoding operations
that need to be executed in order to recover the data.
3.6. Histogram processing
Frequency distribution histograms can be of significant use in
forensic investigations (Garfinkel, 2006). For example,
a frequency histogram of email addresses found on a hard
drive readily identifies the drive’s primary user and that
person’s primary contacts.
Histogram generation is integrated with the feature
recording system so that histograms can be created for any
feature or feature substring at the conclusion of media pro-
cessing. For example, the regular expression below extracts
search terms provided to Google, Yahoo, and other popularture. Thread 0 reads data from a physical disk, disk image,
bufs”. These buffers are processed sequentially by the
. zip, pdf and hiberfile) are recursive; they create new sbufs,
t are extracted are stored in feature files which are, in turn,
raphical user interface (GUI), not described in this article,
n of the processing.
Fig. 2 e Two excerpts from a feature file generated by processing the disk image ubnist1.gen3.E01 (Garfinkel et al., 2009). The
first column is the forensic path within the evidence file; the second column is the extracted email address; the third column
is the email address in context (unprintable characters are represented as underbars). These email addresses are extracted
from executables found within the Linux operating system and as a result do not constitute private information or human
subject data.
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regular expression parenthesis operator:
search.*[?&/;fF][pq]¼([^&/]þ) (1)
Experience has shown that a histogram of the extracted
search terms dramatically improves their usefulness to the
investigator, since items of import tend to be present multiple
times on the subject media.
Histograms of search terms are particularly useful when
conducting an investigation, as they can reveal the intent of
the computer’s user (x6.1). Individuals frequently engage in
repeated searches for items of interest. However, the tool
explicitly does not suppress low-density information, since it
may be quite valuable in some cases. (x3.7 discusses
approaches for weighting features.)
For example, at the 2008 murder trial of Neil Entwistle,
prosecutors introduced evidence that Entwistle had per-
formed Internet searches for murder techniques just three
days before his wife and child were found dead (Associated
Press). The bulk_extractor’s ability to identify, extract and
make histograms of search terms has been used in court with
some success (x6.1).
Once the search terms are extracted, bulk_extractor creates
a histogram of the extracted terms.
Critical to using bulk_extractor’s reports in court is the fact
that the feature file clearly identifies the physical location on
the media from which the search terms were recovered; this
location allows the evidence to be rapidly located and re-
analyzed using other tools.3.7. Context-sensitive stop lists
Many of the email addresses, phone numbers and other
identifiers on a hard drive are distributed as part of the oper-
ating system or application programs. For example, previous
work identified the email address mazrob@panix.com as
being part of the Windows 95 Utopia Sound Scheme
(Garfinkel, 2006). One way to suppress these common features
is to weigh each feature by its inverse corpus frequency,
a novel application of the well-known TF-IDF approach used
in information retrieval (Jones, 1972).
For reasons not anticipated in Garfinkel (2006), it is not
possible for many organizations to create a single list of allemail addresses extracted from every processed disk. Instead,
many organizations manually maintain lists of email
addresses and domain names to ignore based on examiner
experience. Such stop lists can also be readily produced from
default installs of popular operating systems.
There are a staggering number of email addresses and
URLs in some OSes. For example, Fedora Core 12 contains
nearly 14 thousand distinct email addresses (Table 2). Addi-
tional email addresses and URLs are also present in applica-
tion programs. Clearly, a forensic analyst who does not
employ stop lists will be overwhelmed by such information.
However, there is also a significant danger in naı¨vely
employing stop lists: They can provide criminals with the
ability to escape detection by using an email address associ-
ated with an operating system. Given that it is relatively easy
to get an arbitrary email address embedded in open source
programs, this is a significant and previously unrecognized
risk when using stop lists.
One solution, introduced with bulk_extractor, is the context-
sensitive stop list. The key insight is that email addresses such
as mazrob@panix.com should only be ignored when they are
encountered in the context of operating system filesd
elsewhere they should be reported. So instead of a stop list
containing just the email addresses found in default operating
system installs, bulk_extractor uses a stop list that contains the
local contextdthat is, the characters that appear before and
after the feature to be suppressed.
Table1 shows theresultsofhistogramprocessingonthenps-
2009-domexusers disk image before and after the application of
a context-sensitive stop list produced from several default
Windows XP, 2000 and 2003 installations. The stop list removes
email addresses clearly associated with certificate authorities
(e.g. ips@mail.ips.edu and premium-server@thawte.com), but
leaves those email addresses associated with the scenario.
Items on a stop list are not suppressed entirely. Instead,
they are reported in specially designated feature files. This
allows the examiner to manually review the stopped items to
verify that no case-specific information was inadvertently
excluded. It also allows validation of the stop list processing.3.8. Alert lists (“Go lists”)
Whereas a Stop List is a list of features that should be sup-
pressed, an Alert List (also known has a “Go List”) is a list of
features that, when found, may warrant further investigation
Table 1 e Histogram analysis of the nps-2009-domexusers disk image before and after the application of the context-
sensitive stop list. The email address 49091023.6070302@gmail.com is the Message-ID of a webmail message. This
histogram was generated with an earlier version of bulk_extractor.
Before After
Freq Email Freq Email
n ¼ 579 domexuser1@gmail.com n ¼ 579 domexuser1@gmail.com
n ¼ 432 domexuser2@gmail.com n ¼ 432 domexuser2@gmail.com
n ¼ 340 domexuser3@gmail.com n ¼ 340 domexuser3@gmail.com
n ¼ 268 ips@mail.ips.es n ¼ 192 domexuser2@live.com
n ¼ 252 premium-server@thawte.com n ¼ 153 domexuser2@hotmail.com
n ¼ 244 CPS-requests@verisign.com n ¼ 146 domexuser1@hotmail.com
n ¼ 242 someone@example.com n ¼ 134 domexuser1@live.com
n ¼ 237 inet@microsoft.com n ¼ 91 premium-server@thawte.com
n ¼ 192 domexuser2@live.com n ¼ 70 talkback@mozilla.org
n ¼ 153 domexuser2@hotmail.com n ¼ 69 hewitt@netscape.com
n ¼ 146 domexuser1@hotmail.com n ¼ 54 DOMEXUSER2@GMAIL.COM
n ¼ 134 domexuser1@live.com n ¼ 48 domexuser1%40gmail.com@imap.gmail.com
n ¼ 115 example@passport.com n ¼ 42 domex2@rad.li
n ¼ 115 myname@msn.com n ¼ 39 lord@netscape.com
n ¼ 110 ca@digsigtrust.com n ¼ 37 49091023.6070302@gmail.com
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investigator. The bulk_extractorhas provisions for a global alert
list. Such a list could be email addresses known to be associ-
ated with fraud, IP addresses known to be associated with
malware, and so on.4. Implementation
The bulk_extractor is a command-line program that imple-
ments the design described in the previous section and has
been deployed to several production environments around
the world. Version 1.2.0 of bulk_extractor consisted of 12,255
lines of Cþþ code and 1086 lines of GNU flex code. Fig. 1
depicts a conceptual overview of the program.
4.1. Functional modules
The current implementation of bulk_extractor consists of
five modules:Table 2 e Number of unique features of each type found by bul
the hits in the CCNs column appear to be false positives. Thes
bulk_extractor.
VM CCNs Domains Email
fedora12-64 1 13,973 21,612
macos10.6 35 2432 2669
redhat54-ent-64 0 12,345 17,669
win2003-32bit 0 475 227
win2003-64bit 0 330 172
win2008-r2-64 64 565 254
win7-enterprise-32 68 699 365
win7-ultimate-64 68 677 371
winXP-32bit-sp3 0 492 306
winXP-64bit 0 404 2621. The initialization module verifies command line parame-
ters, and creates the analysis thread pool.
2. The image processing module reads the disk image,
extracts a series of pages, and passes each page off to
a thread in the thread pool.
3. The analysis thread pool operates over multiple threads,
each of which receives an incoming page and processes it
with one or more feature scanners.
4. The feature scanners process each buffer and identifies
features that can be recovered.
5. The feature recordingmodule records features identified by
the scanners in one or more feature files.4.2. Scanner implementation
Purpose-built scanners using hand-tuned rules extract
forensic information, an approach validated in the 1990s by
natural language researchers (Nadeau and Sekine, 2007). The
email and accounts scanners are both implemented ask_extractor on various base operating system installs. All of
e numbers were generated with an earlier version of
Exif RFC822 Tel. URLs ZIPs
119 2017 662 75,555 55,172
909 485 256 6781 55,793
36 2052 3773 25,078 20,749
6 41 65 7878 149
5 40 42 7421 163
37 105 77 8196 91
149 110 77 6800 91
145 100 78 6606 105
7 61 132 8916 296
17 68 54 7869 296
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(Fig. 3). This technique creates object code that can be mega-
bytes in size, but nevertheless runs quickly. Another scanner
implements the AES key-finding algorithm developed by
Halderman et al. (2009).
Early scanners produced unacceptably high levels of false
positives when processing PDFs, TIFFs, and other file types
containing long runs of formatted numbers. The false posi-
tives were decreased with additional hand-tuned filters that
examine the local context in which the features are found. For
example, EnCase 6.2.1 identifies the string “Box [568 307
2000 1006] /FontName” as containing the US phone number
“307 2000”, but bulk_extractor does not, as it recognizes that
the numbers are part of a larger group that does not conform
to the US phone number pattern.
The bulk_extractor uses a straightforward API with
a single callable function to initialize each scanner, process
bulk data, and perform post-processing. Scanners can be
linked into the bulk_extractor executable or loaded at run
time. This makes it easy for organizations to extend bul-
k_extractor using proprietary technology while still main-
taining an open source base that is usable by the general
community.
The current scanners distributed with the open source
bulk_extractor are shown in Table 3.4.3. The margin
While it is straightforward to process a disk image block-by-
block or page-by-page, occasionally important features cross
block or page boundaries. Several file carvers that process bulk
data simply discard features that cross these boundaries.
Analysts interviewed were generally unaware that their tools
might systematically discard boundary-crossing features:Fig. 3 e These excerpts from bulk_extractor’s scan_accts.flex inpu
multiple regular expressions are combined with external validat
and other types of information. Although these regular expressi
offer high speed and an astonishingly low false positive rate.upon learning of this behavior, they pronounced it
unacceptable.
The bulk_extractor avoids this problembyappending to each
buffer a margin of additional bytes from the following page of
the evidence file. The implementation thus maintains two
lengths for each buffer: the page size and themargin size. These
valuesmaybe specified by theuser; the defaults are 16MiB and
1 MiB respectively. These defaults were determined experi-
mentally but can be readily changed as necessary.
The design of the margin poses minimal performance
overhead: while features can extend into themargin, once the
analysis point passes into the margin, the scanner stops.
Thus, features that begin in the margin are never considered.
The only significant overhead is the double-reading of the
data in the margin itself, although this data is typically
cached, minimizing the performance impact.
Themargin needs to be large enough so that any feature or
compressed region that begins near the end of the current
page will likely fit within the margin. The value of 1 MiB is
sufficient to cover most compressed streams. However, in
cases involving source code analysis, where there are likely to
be large .tar.gz archives, it is necessary to use a margin that is
larger than the largest anticipated archive.4.4. Parallelizing bulk_extractor
Many authors have noted that it is vital for forensic tools to
adopt parallelism both in order to keep up with increasing
forensic collection sizes and to make the most efficient use of
modern hardware (e.g.Ayers, 2009; Richard and Roussev, 2006).
Vendors have been slow to parallelize their tools because of the
complexity of managingmultiple analyzers and combining the
results in a thread-safe manner. The approach of treating the
disk image as a series of independent pages turns featuret file for GNU flex (The Flex Project, 2008) shows how
ors to extract credit card numbers, FedEx account numbers,
ons must be manually created, tuned and maintained, they
Fig. 4 e Speed of bulk_extractor to process the 2.1 GB disk
image nps-2009-ubnist1.gen3 as a function of number of
threads and threading model. Reference computer was
aMacProwitha2GHz IntelCore i7CPUwith8GBof1333MHz
DDR3 RAM. The i7 has four physical cores and four virtual
cores with hyperthreading. Notice that the thread pool
shows linear performance improvement as the utilization of
physical cores increases, and thenagain linear improvement
(at a slower rate) as utilization of the hyperthreading virtual
cores increases. Increasing the number of threads beyond
the number of virtual cores results in no further
improvement of performance.
Table 3 e Scanners included with bulk_extractor 1.2.
Name Recognizes
Basic Scanners:
scan_accts Credit card numbers, phone numbers, and other formatted numbers
scan_aes AES key schedules in memory
scan_email RFC822 headers, HTTP Cookies, hostnames, IP addresses, email addresses, URLs
scan_exif JPEG EXIF headers
scan_find User-provided regular expression searches
scan_gps Garmin-formatted XML containing GPS coordinates
scan_json Javascript Object Notation (JSON)
scan_kml KML file recovery
scan_net IP and TCP packets in virtual memory; creates libpcap files
scan_winprefetch Windows prefetch files
scan_wordlist Words (for password cracking)
Recursive Scanners:
scan_base64 BASE64 coding
scan_gzip gzip (Deutsch, 1996a) compressed files (including HTTP streams)
scan_hiberfile Windows hibernation file decompression
scan_pdf DEFLATE (Deutsch, 1996b) compressed streams in PDF files and text extraction
scan_zip Components of ZIP compressed files
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 5 6e7 266extraction into an “embarrassingly parallel” problem, as each
page can be processed independently once features that cross
page boundaries are properly handled (x4.3).
A series of tests using the 2.1 GB nps-2009-ubnist1 disk
image (Garfinkel et al., 2009) validates bulk_extractor’s multi-
threading approach and demonstrates the relative perfor-
mance of multiple threads under Windows and MacOS. The
test machine was a MacBook Pro with 8GiB of RAM and 2 Ghz
four-core Intel i7 processor, and an SSD; the machine was
reboot between each trial to assure that the disk image was
not cached in the system’s RAM.
With a single thread, MacOS required on average 3998 s to
analyze the disk image, for an averageperformance of 0.53MB/
sec.With four analyzing threads the performance increased to
2.5MB/secdroughly a linear speedup, as evidenced by the first
part of Fig. 4. Cores 5 through 8 are hyperthreaded, meaning
that the processor runs instructions on these virtual “cores”
when thevarious functional units arenot otherwise inuse.Not
surprisingly, there isno longera strict linear speedup,although
the region of the graph as the number of cores are increased
from 5 to 8 is itself linear. With eight analyzing threads
performance increased to 3.0 MB/s. Thus, the additional four
hyperthreaded “cores” provide roughly the power as a single
physical core. This is uncharacteristically poor performance
for hyperthreading, and it argues that the bulk_extractor
threads aremaking excellent use of the CPU’s functional units,
leaving few resources available for the virtualized cores.
Additional threads resulted in lowerperformance, presumably
due to contention. For this reason, bulk_extractor automatically
determines the correct number of analyzing threads to use
when it runs, freeing the examiner from this task.
Although linear speedup is also observed under Windows,
the peak performance was roughly two-thirds of the same
hardware running MacOS. No speedup is observed when the
virtual cores are added. There is no good explanation for the
poor performance of bulk_extractor under the Windows oper-
ating system, although other programs that run under both
Windows and MacOS behave similarly.A realistic comparison with EnCase was performed using
the 40 GB nps-2009-domexusers disk image as test data and
a typical examiner’s machine: a dual-processor Xenon X5650
at 2.67 Ghz (12 physical cores, 12 hyperthreaded cores), with
12 GiB RAM running Windows 7 Professional. The test was
simple: extract and report all of the email addresses in the
disk image. The results (Fig. 5) indicate that the multi-
threaded bulk_extractor extracted email addresses from the
forensic test disk image 10 faster than EnCase 6.2.1 running
on the same hardware, and was only 5% slower than simply
running ewfexport, strings and grep (Fig. 5) while performing
significantly more analysis. As will be shown in x5.1,
Fig. 5 e Guidance Software’s EnCase 6.2.1 takes 7h, 8min to
extract email addresses and other information from the
42 GB disk image nps-2009-domexusers. The bulk_extractor
performs the same task in 274 min in single-threaded
mode, and in 44 min in multi-threaded mode. The
combination of ewfexport, strings and grep runs fastest, in
just 42 min, but unlike bulk_extractor cannot extract email
addresses fromcompresseddata regions and fails to extract
other information such as URLs and credit card numbers.
Tests were performed on a MacPro with 16 GiB 1066 MHz
DDR3 and two 2.26GHzquad-core Intel Xeonprocessors, for
12 physical cores and 12 virtual cores with hyperthreading.
The strings and grep commandswere run under the Cygwin
POSIX emulation environment. This graph was generated
with a previous version of bulk_extractor.
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than either EnCase or strings, because of its ability to extract
strings from compressed regions and from fragments of PDF
and hibernation files. Furthermore, bulk_extractor extracts
binary information that neither EnCase nor strings currently
finds, such as AES encryption keys.
Both EnCase and bulk_extractor produce files that can be
used to dramatically speed subsequent analysis. EnCase
produces an index file that can be used for full-text searching,
whereas bulk_extractor produces feature files that can be
rapidly searched using the Java-based bulk_extractor user
interface. Thus, both tools allow for searched email addresses
to be used as keys for finding additional information such as
the time a message was sent or the body of an email.5. Validation
This section discusses how bulk_extractor has been tested with
constructed test data, clean operating system installs, and real
data.
5.1. Constructed test drives
Although the recovery of email addresses from disk drives
is a common forensic task, there are no standard tests or
data sets.
Faced with this lack of test images, a series of test docu-
ments was created using various office productivity applica-
tions. Each document contained a single descriptive email
address. Some of the documents were placed in a clearedFAT32 disk image; others were used to generate PDF files that
were placed on the disk image. The disk image was then
subjected to analysis with bulk_extractor, EnCase 6.2.1, and
finally with the traditional combination of strings followed by
grep as a control.
For every target, bulk_extractor finds more email addresses
than either EnCase or the control, primarily because of its
ability to detect and recursively re-analyze compressed data
(Table 4). The only email addresses that bulk_extractor fails to
find are those in PDF files generated by Microsoft Office.
Analysis reveals that while Apple’s TextEdit preserves many
strings (Fig. 6) in the PDF file, Microsoft Word does not (Fig. 7).
Carrier (2010) has stated that the only reliable way to extract
text from PDFs is to render the page and process it with an
optical character recognition program, a strategy that bulk_
extractor does not employ.
5.2. Base OS installs
It is important to test forensic tools with base installations of
operating systems: characterizing the tool’s behavior on base
installs helps to predict how the tool will behave on the same
OS files when they are present on subject media.
Analyzing Linux systems with bulk_extractor yields thou-
sands of domains, email addresses, URLs, telephone numbers,
and components of ZIP files. Inspection reveals that the
domains and email addresses were largely those of Linux
developers; the URLs were typically those of open source
software update distribution points, web-based services used
for software updates and XML schema; the telephone
numbers are from software license agreements. For example,
the most common phone number (found 47 times) in the
Fedora 12 release was (412) 268-4387 (the number of the Car-
negieMellon University office of Technology Transfer, present
in several copyright licenses). The most common false posi-
tives come from arrays of numbers in PDF files that are
grouped in patterns resembling phone numbers. Adding a rule
to discard any phone number preceded by a pair of 3 or 4 digit
numbers or followed by the characters _/Subtype largely
solved this problem.
The Windows operating systems are, comparatively
speaking, quite clean. In the default Windows installations
there are only a few email addresses, but there are a signifi-
cant number of strings that appear to be “IP addresses” which
are actually version numbers and SNMP OIDs. The accuracy
rate of the IP address scanner could be improved by consid-
ering a larger context.
The results from running bulk_extractor on base OS installs
can be used for creating context-sensitive stop lists (x3.7).
5.3. Prevalence of compressed email addresses
To gauge the value of bulk_extractor’s optimistic decompres-
sion, used disks and USB storage devices still containing data
from their original users were analyzed for the presence of
email addresses that could be recovered using gzip or ZIP
decompression and that were not otherwise present.
The disk images, taken from the Real Data Corpus
(Garfinkel et al., 2009), come mostly from China, India, Israel
and Mexico. Previous research has established that used
Table 4 e Email addresses were stored in sample documents using specific applications. The documents were copied into
a disk image. The resulting image was analyzed separately with strings and grep, EnCase, and bulk_extractor. This table
shows which email addresses could be recovered.
email address Application (encoding) strings & grep EnCase BE
plain_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-8) ✔ ✔ ✔
plain_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
rtf_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (RTF) ✔ ✔ ✔
rtf_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
plain_utf16@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-16) ✔ ✔
plain_utf16_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
pages@iwork09.com Apple Pages ‘09 ✔ ✔ ✔
pages_comment@iwork09.com Apple Pages (comment) ’09 ✔
keynote@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 ✔
keynote_comment@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 (comment) ✔
numbers@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 ✔
numbers_comment@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 (comment) ✔
user_doc@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.doc file) ✔ ✔ ✔
user_doc_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF
user_docx@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.docx file) ✔
user_docx_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF (.docx file)
xls_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔ ✔ ✔
xls_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (Comment) ✔
doc_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
docx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
ppt_within_doc@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .ppt
file within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
pptx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .pptx
file within .docx)
✔
xls_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xls file
within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
xlsx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xlsx file
within .docx)
✔
email_in_zip@zipfile1.com text file within ZIP ✔
email_in_zip_zip@zipfile2.com ZIP’ed text file, ZIP’ed ✔
email_in_gzip@gzipfile.com text file within gzip ✔
email_in_gzip_gzip@gzipfile.com gzip’ed text file, gzip’ed ✔
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stores, in open-air markets, and other venues, frequently
contain information left from their former users. As a result,
the data from used computer systems can be productively
used as a surrogate for digital media acquired during the
course of law enforcement operations. Information collected
on the secondary market in this fashion has the advantage of
being usable in research, as it does not contain law-
enforcement sensitive information, provided that sufficient
privacy controls are in place. This study further confirms
those research findings.Fig. 6 e An inflated stream from a PDF file created using
Apple’s TextEdit application. The original document
contained the string “plain_text_pdf@textedit.com”. Notice
that the email address is preserved in the output.To gauge the age of each drive, the Date: headers in email
messages found on the disks were also extracted with
bulk_extractor. The date of each disks’ last activity was
computed by averaging the five most recent timestamps.
Visual inspection of a randomly chosen sample confirmed
that the extracted timestamps did in fact correspond to
actual times.
Email addresses present on more than a single drive were
discarded. The remaining addresses were tabulated according
to whether each email address appeared in plaintext or in
a compressed stream. There were 865 drives that contained
email addresses, of which 431 also contained timestamps.
Table 5 presents, for each year, the number of drives recov-
ered for that year, the total number of email addresses, the
number of email addresses encoded with each compression
algorithm, and the number of email addresses only present on
a single drive.
As shown, there area significantnumberof email addresses
that can only be recovered by optimistically decompressing
forensic data, demonstrating once again that the recall
performance of forensic tools can be significantly improved
through the use of optimistic decompression.
Fig. 7 e An inflated stream from a PDF file created using
Microsoft Word 2008 for Macintosh. The original document
contained the string “This is a testduser_doc_pdf@
microsoftword.com Really.” Notice that the email address
is split into three pieces.
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This section discuss two cases in which bulk_extractor
provided timely information that proved critical to real-world
investigations.Table 5eA study of 431disk drives acquired around theworld s
that can only be recovered by decompressing ZIP and gzip-com
restricted to those that were found on a single hard drive in th
Email addresses found
Year Drives Total In ZIP Uniq
1991 1 57 0
1992 1 2663 0
1993 2 33,352 0
1994 4 18,401 310
1995 13 76,469 53
1996 19 314,340 10
1997 16 755,597 276
1998 30 252,811 66
1999 30 1,167,208 79
2000 51 2,709,526 67,221
2001 51 1,180,587 360
2002 46 6,336,891 414
2003 44 1,654,880 429
2004 49 2,746,356 1088
2005 27 351,238 75
2006 26 326,480 56
2007 17 828,229 301
2008 4 799,127 96.1. Credit card fraud
In the spring of 2010 the San Luis Obispo, CA, County District
Attorney’s Office “filed charges of credit card fraud case and
possession of materials to make fraudulent credit cards
against two individuals” (Lehr, 2010). The day before the
suspects’ preliminary hearing, an evidence technician at the
SLO police department was given a 250 GB hard drive that had
been seized in conjunction with the suspects’ arrest. The
technician was told to find evidence that tied the suspects to
the alleged crime; the defense was expected to claim that the
computer belonged to an unindicted associate, and that the
defendants lacked computer skills.
An early version of bulk_extractor was able to analyze the
hard drive in roughly 2.5 h. The program quickly established
that:
 More than 10,000 credit card numbers were present on the
hard drive.
 The most common email address clearly belonged to the
primary defendant, disproving his contention that he had
no connection to the drive and helping to establish the
defendant’s possession of the credit card numbers.
 Themost common Internet search queries concerned credit
card fraud and bank identification numbers. This helped to
establish the defendant’s intent to commit fraud (Lehr,
2010).
Based on the reports generated by bulk_extractor and the
testimony of the technician, the court concluded that the
District Attorney had met the burden of proof to hold the
suspects pending trial.
It is unlikely that such high quality reporting could have
been generated so quickly (andwith so little effort on the part
of the investigator) with a conventional forensic tool. Givenhows that there is a significant presence of email addresses
pressed data streams. The email addresses in this table are
e study.
uely in a single
ZIP stream
In gzip Uniquely in a single
gzip stream
0 0 0
0 16 0
0 255 20
0 1096 421
14 1353 71
1 43,567 1532
86 31,057 1066
4 297 14
4 118 11
306 199,063 3615
109 9118 710
57 341,810 9178
95 19,444 563
222 30,705 9989
3 2656 127
7 1370 40
0 3319 388
2 2171 59
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would have been granted bail without the bulk_extractor
results and might have left the country, complicating
prosecution.
6.2. ATM fraud
Also in 2010, A 250 GB disk drive was recovered from indi-
viduals suspected of placing credit-card “skimmers” and
pinhole cameras at ATM machines in a major US city. Police
needed to rapidly supply the banks with a list of the
compromised credit card numbers so that the accounts could
be closed.
The bulk_extractor completed its processing after just 2 h on
a quad-core computer. The banks in question were provided
with the ccns.txt output file (a list of credit-card numbers found
on the drive), and were able to immediately shut down the
accounts before fraud could be committed.
As in the previous case, it is unlikely that conventional file-
based tools could have found the compromised credit card
numbers in so short a time. Although a program such as strings
might have extracted some of the email addresses and credit
card numbers, it would not have created the histograms or
suppressed false-positives. (The bulk_extractor credit card
scanner includes substantial code for suppressing numbers
that satisfy the Luhn (1960) algorithm but are nevertheless not
valid. Because the Lhun algorithm is a single digit checksum, 1-
out-of-10 sequencesof randomdigits that are thecorrect length
satisfy the check. For example, 5555-4444-3333-2226 satisfies
the Lhun algorithm. The bulk_extractor suppresses the number
because of the abnormal distribution of digits. Additional
checks that examine the local context are described in Section
4.2.) Being able to find the card numbers in short orderwas vital
to blocking the cards before fraud could be committed.7. Limitations and future work
Bulk data analysis and the bulk_extractor are designed to
complement traditional forensic approaches, not replace
them. This section discusses specific limitations that have
been encountered and the outlook for this technology.
7.1. Theoretical limitations of bulk data analysis
The primary limitation of bulk data analysis is that
compressed objects fragmented across multiple locations are
difficult to recover. However, with the exception of log files,
most forensically interesting files are not fragmented
(Garfinkel, 2007). While most log files are fragmented, most
are stored without compression, allowing the various frag-
ments to be matched and recombined. In the rare cases that
compressed objects are fragmented, Memon has shown that
decompressing the compressed streams can be used as a tool
for fragment reassembly (Sencar and Memon, 2009).
7.2. Unicode and internationalization
Unicode and non-Latin character sets pose challenges for bulk
data processing and extraction. An added complication is thatASCII and Unicode are not the only types of localized strings
likely to be found. Data may be coded using a Windows Code
Page, Big5, EUC-JP, GB18030, Shift-JIS, or other coding
schemes.
Fortunately, most email addresses and URLs encountered
today are in simple ASCII or ASCII encoded as UTF-16, both of
which are handled by bulk_extractor. In the near term, bul-
k_extractor will be modified to incorporate other strategies.
7.3. Characterization of bulk data
In addition to feature extraction, it is also useful at times to
report on the overall characteristics of bulk data. For this
reason a future version of bulk_extractor will implement an
algorithm, previously described, for distinguishing
compressed data from encrypted data (Garfinkel et al., 2010),
and will report the amount of encrypted data present on the
digital media being examined.
7.4. Correlation with other kinds of forensic data
Much of the information that is produced by a run of bulk_ex-
tractor can be correlated with other kinds of forensic informa-
tion. For example, the output of bulk_extractor can be readily
used for cross-drive analysis (Garfinkel, 2006). It is also possible to
use network contextual data to provide linkage to other kinds
of network forensics data. Such linkage can be critical in scene
reconstruction for the eventual courtroom presentation.8. Conclusion
This paper discusses a number of advances in the field of bulk
data analysis and presents the design and implementation of
the bulk_extractor, a forensic tool that extracts forensic
features from bulk data. Information extracted by bulk_ex-
tractor is reported in feature files that indicate where each
feature was found in the source file. The bulk_extractor also
performs histogram analysis. Histograms can be used to
rapidly determine the most common email addresses and
most frequent search terms present on a hard drive. The tool
optimistically decompresses compressed data that it
encounters.
The bulk_extractor was developed as a research platform
but has found use in actual cases. The program’s source code,
ancillary programs, and pre-compiled executables for
Windows are available for download at http://forensicswiki.
org/wiki/bulk_extractor/. The code is public domain and may
be freely incorporated into other open source or commercial
applications.
The constructed drive image can be downloaded from
http://digitalcorpora.org.
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